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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE
SOUTH CAROLINA UNFAIR TRADE
PRACTICES ACT
MICHAEL R. SMITH"
In 1971 the South Carolina General Assembly enacted the South
Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA).' The Act's operative
language, contained in South Carolina Code section 39-5-20(a),2 is very
simple:3 "Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared
unlawful."' The Act permits actions either by the South Carolina Attorney
General5 or by a private party who has suffered an ascertainable loss.6
Section 39-5-20(a) is substantially similar to the general proscription in the
Federal Trade Commission Act7 and to the unfair trade practices statutes of
other states.8 In fact, the UTPA provides that courts construing the Act
should be guided by decisions of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and
federal courts interpreting the FTC Act provision.9 Because section 39-5-20
* B.S. 1987, Virginia Commonwealth University; J.D. 1993, University of South
Carolina. The author wishes to thank Professor F. Patrick Hubbard of the University of
South Carolina School of Law for his assistance in preparing this Note and Natalma M.
McKnew, Esq. for her helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. No. 287, 1971 S.C. Acts 369 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5-10 to -160
(Law. Co-op. 1985)).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
3. Despite the UTPA's broad language, the South Carolina Supreme Court has ruled
that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague. Inman v. Ken Hyatt Chrysler Plymouth,
Inc., 294 S.C. 240, 243, 363 S.E.2d 691, 693 (1988).
4. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(a). In addition to its general proscription of unfair and
deceptive practices, the Act also expressly prohibits pyramid clubs and similar
operations. Id. § 39-5-30.
5. Id. § 39-5-50.
6. Id. § 39-5-140.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1988). The entire Federal Trade Commission Act is
codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1988 & Supp. 1111991).
8. See generally JONATHAN. SHELDON, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIvE ACTS AND
PRACTICES (3d ed. 1991) (discussing unfair and deceptive trade practice applications
throughout the United States).
9. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(b).
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fails to identify specifically prohibited conduct, the task of deciding which
acts are deceptive or unfair, and therefore illegal, lies with the South
Carolina courts.
In his 1982 South Carolina Law Review article,"0 Professor Day noted
that the UTPA's effect on unfair and deceptive practices had been mini-
mal." He offered many suggestions concerning the proper interpretation
of the Act and predicted that it could become an effective tool for providing
a remedy to those injured by unfair or deceptive trade practices. 12 The
purpose of this Note is to trace the growth and development of UTPA
doctrine since Professor Day's article. This Note explores what constitutes
a violation of the Act, who may be held liable, and what categories of
activities are exempt from UTPA coverage. It also discusses the damages
recoverable upon proof of a violation. In relevant areas, the author
compares the South Carolina UTPA with the federal scheme and with unfair
trade practices statutes and cases from other states. Finally, the author
examines recurring UTPA actions as well as areas amenable to UTPA
treatment that have yet to be interpreted.
I. SCOPE OF SECTION 39-5-20(a)
A. Unfair and Deceptive Defined
Although the UTPA declares unfair acts or practices unlawful, 3
neither of the South Carolina appellate courts had defined "unfair" until
Young v. Century Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. 4 In Young the plaintiff took her
car to the defendant dealership for repairs after the car had been involved
in a collision. The dealership charged the plaintiff over $2,300 more for
additional repairs than stated in its written estimate. Rather than informing
the plaintiff of the additional work required, the dealership sought and
received approval to complete the repairs from the plaintiffs insurance
company.15 The court of appeals upheld the jury's verdict that Century
Lincoln-Mercury had engaged in an unfair trade practice. 6 The court held
that "[a] trade practice is 'unfair' when it is offensive to public policy or
when it is immoral, unethical, or oppressive."' 7 This broad test is consis-
10. Richard E. Day, The South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act: Sleeping Giant
or Illusive Panacea?, 33 S.C. L. REV. 479 (1982).
11. Id. at 515.
12. Id.
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(a).
14. 302 S.C. 320, 396 S.E.2d 105 (Ct. App. 1989), aff'd in part and rev'd in part
on other grounds, 422 S.E.2d 103 (S.C. 1992) (per curiam).
15. Id. at 323-24, 396 S.E.2d at 106-07.
16. Id. at 328, 396 S.E.2d at 109.
17. Id. at 326, 396 S.E.2d at 108 (citing Harris v. NCNB Nat'l Bank, 355 S.E.2d
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tent with the court's statement that "[t]he UTPA should be given a liberal
construction. "18
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has adopted a broad and
flexible test of unfairness in construing 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). 19 In FTC v.
Motion Picture Advertising Service Co.' the Court noted that Congress
intended the phrase "unfair methods of competition" "to be defined with
particularity by the myriad of cases from the field of business. "21 Thus,
"[t]he point where a method of competition becomes 'unfair' within the
meaning of the Act will often turn on the exigencies of a particular situation,
trade practices, or the practical requirements of the business in question. "I
Consequently, whether a particular practice is unfair under federal law is a
fact-specific question to be decided on a case-by-case basis.
The South Carolina Supreme Court first defined "deceptive"' in State
ax rel. McLeod v. Brown.24 Following the approach of the Forth Circuit,
the Brown court held that a practice is deceptive if it has a tendency to
deceive, but proof of actual deception is not required.21 In addition, the
court of appeals further refined the definition of "deceptive" when it ruled
that "proof of common law fraud is not required to establish a violation of
the Act. "26 Accordingly, a party need not "show that a representation was
intended to deceive but only that it had the capacity to do so."27
Courts construing 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) have reached the same
conclusion concerning the meaning of the term "deceptive" within the
federal scheme. They have ruled that neither actual deception' nor intent
838 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987)).
18. Id. at 325, 396 S.E.2d at 108.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1988).
20. 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
21. Id. at 394 (citing FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 310-12 (1934)).
22. Id. at 396; accord FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965).
23. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985) (forbidding deceptive acts
in the conduct of trade or commerce).
24. 278 S.C. 281, 294 S.E.2d 781 (1982).
25. Id. at 285, 294 S.E.2d at 783 (citing United States Retail Credit Ass'n v. FTC,
300 F.2d 212, 221 (4th Cir. 1962)).
26. State ex reL McLeod v. C & L Corp., 280 S.C. 519, 525, 313 S.E.2d 334, 338
(Ct. App. 1984); accord Dowdv. Imperial Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 298 S.C. 439, 441,
381 S.E.2d 212, 213 (Ct. App. 1989).
27. Inman v. Ken Hyatt Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 294 S.C. 240, 242, 363 S.E.2d
691, 692 (1988) (citing C &L Corp., 280 S.C. 519, 313 S.E.2d 334); see also Young
v. Century Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 302 S.C. 320, 326, 396 S.E.2d 105, 108 (Ct. App.
1989) ("Even a truthful statement may be deceptive if it has a capacity or tendency to
deceive.")
28. Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. FTC, 594 F.2d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1979); Thiret
v. FTC, 512 F.2d 176, 180 (10th Cir. 1975).
1993]
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to deceive29 is required to prove that a practice is deceptive within the
meaning of the statute. Furthermore, North Carolina courts, interpreting a
state statute30 identical to the federal provision, have held that a capacity
to deceive is sufficient31 and that proof of fraud or actual deception is not
required.
32
B. The Trade or Commerce Requirement
Section 39-5-10(b) of the UTPA provides:
"Trade" and "commerce" shall include the advertising, offering for
sale, sale or distribution of any services and any property, tangible or
intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity or
thing of value wherever situate, and shall include any trade or commerce
directly or indirectly affecting the people of this State.33
In Baker v. Chavis"4 the court of appeals addressed the scope of this
section and held that "[t]he statute's use of the words 'shall include' clearly
suggests the legislature did not intend to limit 'trade' and 'commerce' to
only the listed transactions. "3 The court also noted that the terms "trade"
and "commerce" are synonymous, and that "trade" encompasses the
business activities of both buying and selling. 36 The court concluded that
a time-share resort was engaged in trade and commerce within the meaning
of the statute when it sold portions of equity (leasehold interests) in its
property.
37
After Baker questions remain about whether plaintiffs and defendants
must have been engaged in the business of buying or selling to each other
29. Rayex Corp. v. FTC, 317 F.2d 290,292 (2d Cir. 1963); Pep Boys-Manny, Moe
& Jack, Inc. v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158, 161 (3d Cir. 1941).
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (1988).
31. Ken-Mar Fin. v. Harvey, 368 S.E.2d 646, 648 (N.C. Ct. App.), review denied,
373 S.E.2d 545 (N.C. 1988); Pinehurst, Inc. v. O'Leary Bros. Realty, 338 S.E.2d 918,
923 (N.C. Ct. App.), review denied and stay denied, 342 S.E.2d 896 (N.C. 1986).
32. Marshall v. Miller, 276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (N.C. 1981).
33. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-10(b) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
34. 306 S.C. 203, 410 S.E.2d 600 (Ct. App. 1991).
35. Id. at 208-09, 410 S.E.2d at 603; cf. Sunshine Sportswear & Elecs., Inc. v.
WSOC Television, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 1499, 1505 (D.S.C. 1989) (explaining that the
statutory definitions of trade and commerce are only examples of several acts covered
by the UTPA, but that the definitions do not include defamatory statements).
36. Baker, 306 S.C. at 209, 410 S.E.2d at 603 (citing May v. Sloan, 101 U.S. 231,
237 (1879)).
37. Id. at 209, 410 S.E.2d at 603-04.
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to fall within the scope of the UTPA. For example, in Connolly v. People's
Life Insurance Co. ,3 an earlier decision interpreting section 39-5-10(b), the
court of appeals held that the plaintiff-mortgagor had no cause of action
under the Act against an assignee of the original mortgagee because of the
trade or commerce requirement. 39 The assignee's alleged failure to
properly mark the note as paid and to return to the plaintiff the note and
mortgage did not involve the advertising, sale, or distribution of services or
property to the plaintiff.4"
Clearly, the defendant-assignee in Connolly was in the business of
selling insurance, although not to the plaintiff. Moreover, the defendant's
relationship to the plaintiff arose because the defendant was in the insurance
business, and the defendant's allegedly unfair practices were of the type
normally connected with its business activities. Nevertheless, the court of
appeals found that the trade and commerce requirement had not been met.41
This finding suggests that the court of appeals will require proof that some
type of buying or selling occurred between the two litigants themselves.
C. Public Impact Requirement
South Carolina appellate courts have created an important element of
a UTPA claim by ruling that the Act is unavailable to "redress a private
wrong where the public interest is unaffected."42 The court of appeals first
articulated this public impact requirement in Noack Enterprises, Inc. v.
Country Corner Interiors, Inc.43 The dispute in Noack involved alleged
misrepresentations made by the seller of a retail business. The plaintiff-
purchaser charged that the defendant failed to carry out its promises in
38. 294 S.C. 355, 364 S.E.2d 475 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, 299 S.C. 348, 384 S.E.2d
738 (1989).
39. Id. at 359, 364 S.E.2d at 477.
40. Id.
41. See id. However, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed on the procedural
ground that the court of appeals improperly decided the trade or commerce issue when
the issue had not been raised or argued at trial. Connolly v. People's Life Ins. Co., 299
S.C. 348, 350-51, 384 S.E.2d 738, 739-40 (1989) (per curiam).
42. Noack Enters., Inc. v. Country Comer Interiors, Inc., 290 S.C. 475, 479, 351
S.E.2d 347, 350 (Ct. App. 1986); accord Florence Paper Co. v. Orphan, 298 S.C. 210,
379 S.E.2d 289 (1989); LaMotte v. Punch Line, Inc., 296 S.C. 66, 370 S.E.2d 711
(1988); Young v. Century Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 302 S.C. 320, 396 S.E.2d 105 (Ct.
App. 1989); Columbia E. Assocs. v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 299 S.C. 515, 386 S.E.2d 259 (Ct.
App. 1989); Dowd v. Imperial Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 298 S.C. 439, 381 S.E.2d 212
(Ct. App. 1989).
43. 290 S.C. 475, 351 S.E.2d 347 (Ct. App. 1986).
19931
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connection with the sale.' The court of appeals affirmed the trial judge's
grant of demurrer to the defendant because the complaint failed to allege
facts sufficient to show that the private dispute affected the public inter-
est.45
The Noack court found a public impact requirement based on its
examination of three provisions of the UTPA. First, the court noted that
section 39-5-70(a)16 allows the attorney general to initiate an investigation
of an unfair or deceptive trade practice when the public interest is impli-
cated.47 Second, section 39-5-140(b)48 requires the clerk of court to notify
the attorney general of any private suit brought under the Act. 49 The court
found that these two sections, read together, demonstrate the "legislature's
intent to limit the application of the UTPA to only those unfair or deceptive
acts or practices . . . that affect the public interest.""0 Finally, the court
examined section 39-5-10(b)51 and concluded that the section's "language
[also] reflects the legislature's intent than [sic] an unfair or deceptive act or
practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce injuriously affect 'the
people of this State,' i.e., the public interest, before it can be actionable
under the UTPA."52
Although Noack seems to require that a plaintiff allege in his UTPA
complaint facts showing an impact upon the public interest, the case does
not indicate whether a conclusory allegation of public impact is sufficient to
withstand a motion to dismiss. To avoid a possible demurrer, plaintiffs
should probably allege public impact in their complaints and plead facts that
demonstrate a potential for repetition of the defendant's conduct.
53
The plaintiff has the burden of proving an impact on the public
interest.54 As the court of appeals stated in Barnes v. Jones Chevrolet,
Inc. 55 "a material issue to be proved is that the unfair practice or act
affects persons other than the parties to the transaction."56 In Columbia
44. Id. at 476, 479-80, 351 S.E.2d at 348, 350.
45. Id. at 480-81, 351 S.E.2d at 350-51.
46. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-70(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
47. Noack, 290 S.C. at 477-78, 351 S.E.2d at 349.
48. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(b).
49. Noack, 290 S.C. at 478, 351 S.E.2d at 349.
50. Id.
51. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-10(b).
52. Noack, 290 S.C. at 478, 351 S.E.2d at 349.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 59-60.
54. See Columbia E. Assocs. v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 299 S.C. 515, 386 S.E.2d 259 (Ct. App.
1989); Barnes v. Jones Chevrolet, Inc., 292 S.C. 607, 358 S.E.2d 156 (Ct. App. 1987).
55. 292 S.C. 607, 358 S.E.2d 156.
56. Id. at 612, 358 S.E.2d at 159.
[Vol. 44:543
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East Associates v. Bi-Lo, Inc.5 7 the court of appeals affirmed a directed
verdict for the defendant because the plaintiff failed to prove its allegation
that the defendant's unfair trade practice affected the public.5 8
In attempting to define which activities affect the public interest, the
court of appeals initially held that "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
the conduct of trade or commerce have an impact upon the public interest
if the acts or practices have the potential for repetition. "59 The court later
specified that the potential for repetition is a requirement rather than merely
a factor that may be considered as evidence of public impact.'
South Carolina is not alone in exempting purely private disputes from
UTPA coverage. Under the federal scheme, the FTC can serve a complaint
charging an unfair or deceptive practice only when doing so is in the public
interest.61 Georgia courts have also required a public impact under that
state's version of the UTPA, holding that the statute does "not... provide
an additional remedy for private wrongs which do not and could not affect
the consuming public generally."62 However, in response to a series of
appellate decisions that required an unfair or deceptive trade practice to
affect the public interest, the Connecticut legislature amended the Connecti-
cut UTPA explicitly to remove any public impact requirement. 3
D. Liability of Principals and Corporate Personnel
South Carolina courts have held principals liable under the UTPA
for their agent's acts.' In State ex rel. McLeod v. C & L Corp.6 the
defendant developer sold subdivision lots as part of a development scheme.
The defendant's salesmen made false representations to the plaintiff-buyers
57. 299 S.C. 515, 386 S.E.2d 259 (Ct. App. 1989).
58. Id. at 522, 386 S.E.2d at 263.
59. Noack Enters., Inc. v. Country Comer Interiors, Inc., 290 S.C. 475, 480, 351
S.E.2d 347, 350-51 (Ct. App. 1986) (citing Anhold v. Daniels, 614 P.2d 184 (Wash.
1980) (en banc)); see Dowd v. Imperial Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 298 S.C. 439, 442,
381 S.E.2d 212, 214 (Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Noack, 290 S.C. at 480, 351 S.E.2d at
350-51).
60. Young v. Century Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 302 S.C. 320, 327, 396 S.E.2d 105,
109 (Ct. App. 1989).
61. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1988).
62. Burdakin v. Hub Motor Co., 357 S.E.2d 839, 841 (Ga. Ct. App.) (quoting
Zeeman v. Black, 273 S.E.2d 910, 913 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980)), cert. denied, 357 S.E.2d
839 (Ga. 1987).
63. SHELDON, supra note 8, § 7.5.3.2, at 390.
64. E.g., Young, 302 S.C. 320, 396 S.E.2d 105; State ex reL McLeod v. C & L
Corp., 280 S.C. 519, 313 S.E.2d 334 (Ct. App. 1984).
65. 280 S.C. 519, 313 S.E.2d 334 (Ct. App. 1984).
19931
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concerning improvements to be made in the subdivision.' The corporation
denied liability, asserting that it had no knowledge of the salesmen's
activities.67 In holding the development corporation liable, the court of
appeals noted that, at common law, a principal's actual knowledge is not
required to hold him liable for the acts of his agents.68 Because the UTPA
is remedial and should not impose on plaintiffs additional burdens not found
at common law, principals are liable under the UTPA for their agent's acts
committed within the scope of the agent's authority.69
South Carolina courts have also ruled that persons controlling a
corporation can be held liable under the UTPA for the corporation's
activities.70 The Act's definition of "person" includes "natural persons,
corporations, trusts, partnerships, incorporated or unincorporated associa-
tions and any other legal entity."" In C & L Corp. the court held that this
definition includes controlling persons of a corporation and that "both the
corporation and its controlling persons are liable for a corporate violation
of the Act."72 The court defined a controlling person as "one who formu-
lates and directs corporate policy or who is deeply involved in the important
business affairs of the corporation.'
Other states have taken various approaches in determining the liability
of corporate personnel.74 Some states, such as Kentucky, "will disregard
the corporate entity only where the individual to be held personally liable
actively participated in the scheme, or knew about it and did nothing."Is
In contrast to this restrictive standard, the South Carolina rulings have broad
implications for unwary corporate officers.
76
66. Id. at 524, 313 S.E.2d at 337.
67. Id. at 527, 313 S.E.2d at 339.
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. E.g., State ex reL Medlock v. Nest Egg Soc'y Today, Inc., 290 S.C. 124, 348
S.E.2d 381 (Ct. App. 1986); State ex rel. McLeod v. VIP Enters., Inc., 286 S.C. 501,
335 S.E.2d 243 (Ct. App. 1985); C & L Corp., 280 S.C. 519, 313 S.E.2d 334; see also
State ex rel. McLeod v. Brown, 278 S.C. 281, 294 S.E.2d 781 (1982) (finding genuine
issues of material fact concerning whether an employee was a controlling person).
71. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-10(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
72. C & L Corp., 280 S.C. at 530, 313 S.E.2d at 341.
73. Id. at 531, 313 S.E.2d at 341.
74. See generally SHELDON, supra note 8, § 6.4 (describing various state views
concerning the liability of officers and directors for corporate UTPA violations).
75. Id. at 347 (citing Commonwealth ex rel. Beshearv. ABC Pest Control, Inc., 621
S.W.2d 705 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981)).
76. See supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 44:543
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II. EXEMPTIONS FROM THE UTPA
A. Statutory
Section 39-5-40(a) provides that the UTPA is inapplicable to "[a]ctions
or transactions permitted under laws administered by any regulatory body
or officer acting under statutory authority of this State or the United States
or actions or transactions permitted by any other South Carolina State
law. ""7 The South Carolina appellate courts have struggled with the proper
interpretation of this ambiguous statute, but the supreme court recently
abandoned the "general activity" test that was instituted in State ex rel.
McLeod v. Rhoades.78
The deceptive practice in Rhoades involved the sale of corporate stock.
The defendants contended that their conduct was exempt from the UTPA
under section 39-5-40(a) because stock sales are regulated by the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission and the Securities Commission-
er of South Carolina.7 9 The supreme court agreed and held that "'[w]hen
the party claiming exemption from the Act shows that the general activity
in question is regulated ...[then] the opposing party.. . has the burden
of showing that the specific acts at issue are not covered by the exemp-
tion.'" 80
In Scott v. Mid Carolina Homes, Inc. ,8 the court of appeals expressed
its dissatisfaction with the Rhoades court's broad interpretation of section
39-5-40(a). Scott involved allegations of fraud and misrepresentation in
connection with the sale of a mobile home. Applying the general activity
test, the court of appeals stated that it was bound by Rhoades and hence
"constrained to hold the sale of mobile homes is an activity exempt from the
Act because it is subject to regulatory control and the imposition of penalties
by the Manufactured Housing Board."' The court noted that "[t]he only
remedy available to Mrs. Scott . . . is to ask the Supreme Court to
reconsider its decision in Rhoades or to persuade the General Assembly to
amend the Act."83
77. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-40(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
78. 275 S.C. 104, 267 S.E.2d 539 (1980), modified, Ward v. Dick Dyer & Assocs.,
304 S.C. 152, 403 S.E.2d 310 (1991).
79. Id. at 105, 267 S.E.2d at 540.
80. Id. at 107, 267 S.E.2d at 541 (quoting State v. Piedmont Funding Corp., 382
A.2d 819, 822 (R.I. 1978)); see also Anderson v. Citizens Bank, 294 S.C. 387, 365
S.E.2d 26 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding banking practices exempt from the UTPA under the
general activity test), overruled by Ward, 304 S.C. 152, 403 S.E.2d 310.
81. 293 S.C. 191, 359 S.E.2d 291 (Ct. App. 1987), overruled by Ward, 304 S.C.
152, 403 S.E.2d 310.
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In Bocook Outdoor Media, Inc. v. Summey Outdoor Advertising, Inc.'4
the court of appeals again expressed its discontent with the broad general
activity test. The Bocook court indicated that it was willing to examine
whether the regulations involved were specifically directed at the alleged
unfair practices, rather than merely to ask whether the general activity was
regulated. The court held that the outdoor advertising industry was not
exempt from the UTPA even though the State Highway Department
regulates the issuance of billboard permits to promote highway safety and
scenic beauty.' As the court observed: "Neither the statutes nor the
regulations promulgated pursuant to the statutes address or regulate unfair
competition among outdoor advertisers."86
In Ward v. Dick Dyer & Associates' the supreme court abandoned the
general activity test. The court held that the purpose of section 39-5-40(a)
is to prevent a party from being sued under the UTPA for engaging in an
activity that other laws specifically allow or authorize.88 The court adopted
an interpretation of section 39-5-40(a) designed to prevent a conflict between
laws rather than to exempt generally regulated activities.89 This narrower
exemption is the same interpretation that Professor Day urged upon the
court.90
B. Non-Statutory
In addition to the statutory exemption, South Carolina's appellate courts
have created several exemptions to the UTPA. In Miller v. Fairfield
Communities, Inc.91 the court of appeals held that the Act does not apply
to an employer-employee relationship.' However, the plaintiff-employee
in Miller could not demonstrate that his employer's actions in firing him had
the potential for repetition." Thus, a case involving a pattern of unfair
employee treatment that is likely to be repeated may be decided differently.
84. 294 S.C. 169, 363 S.E.2d 390 (Ct. App. 1987).
85. Id. at 173-74, 363 S.E.2d at 392.
86. Id.
87. 304 S.C. 152, 403 S.E.2d 310 (1991). For a discussion of Ward, see Michael R.
Smith, Survey, Tort Law-Ward v. Dick Dyer & Assocs., 44 S.C. L. REv. 174 (1992).
88. Id. at 156, 403 S.E.2d at 312 (citing Skinner v. Steele, 730 S.W.2d 335 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1987)).
89. Id.
90. See Day, supra note 10, at 500-01.
91. 299 S.C. 23, 382 S.E.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1989), cert. dismissed, 302 S.C. 518, 397
S.E.2d 377 (1990).
92. Id. at 28, 382 S.E.2d at 20.
93. Id. at 29, 382 S.E.2d at 20.
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Furthermore, in Ward94 the supreme court noted in dictum that
securities transactions are exempt from the UTPA because such transactions
are highly regulated.95 Accordingly, the Ward court acknowledged an
exception to its rule that exempts from the Act only activities specifically
authorized by other laws or regulations.96
Finally, although South Carolina courts have yet to decide the issue, in
Clarkson v. Orkin Exterminating Co.' the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, applying South Carolina law, ruled that negligence cannot serve
as the basis for a UTPA action.98 In Clarkson a pest control company
representative negligently failed to discover a termite infestation in the
plaintiff's home. The circuit court reversed the jury verdict for the plaintiff
on her UTPA claim, holding that the serviceman's negligence was "simply
not the kind of deceptive practice the [South Carolina] statute was intended
to reach. "I
However, in an analogous case concerning the use of the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices Act-the Texas equivalent of the UTPA-against
the manufacturer of a defective product, the Texas Court of Appeals held
that the statute applies to personal injury actions." °° This ruling represents
a liberal use of the Texas statute compared to the Fourth Circuit's approach
in Clarkson. Presently, negligence as a cause of action under the UTPA
remains untested in the South Carolina appellate courts.
III. DAMAGES UNDER THE UTPA
A. Appropriate Measure
Section 39-5-140(a) provides that a person may recover actual damages
for a violation of the UTPA.101 In Fields v. Yarborough Ford, Inc.'02 the
supreme court addressed the measure of damages available under the Act.
The plaintiffs in Fields purchased a truck from the defendant automobile
dealership. Although the plaintiffs had requested a certain sized engine in
the vehicle, the dealership sold them a truck with a larger engine, but failed
to inform them of this fact. The Fields brought an action against the
94. 304 S.C. 152, 403 S.E.2d 310 (1991).
95. Id. at 155 n.1, 403 S.E.2d at 312 n.1.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
97. 761 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1985).
98. Id. at 191.
99. Id.
100. Keller Indus., Inc. v. Reeves, 656 S.W.2d 221, 224-25 ('rex. Ct. App. 1983).
101. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
102. 307 S.C. 207, 414 S.E.2d 164 (1992).
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dealership for fraud, breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act,
and unfair trade practices."3
The supreme court stated that in cases of misrepresentation, a plaintiff
can elect either to affirm the contract and seek damages or to rescind the
contract and receive restitution."° When the plaintiff affirms the contract,
the measure of damages is "the difference between the value the plaintiff
would have received if the facts had been as represented and the value he
actually received," plus any special damages proximately caused by the
misrepresentation. 5 However, a party seeking rescission may recover
only the consideration paid and any foreseeable incidental damages incurred
in reliance on the fraudulent misrepresentation." 6 Applying these rules to
the facts in Fields, the supreme court found that, because the plaintiffs
sought to affirm the contract, they suffered no loss since the truck they
received with the larger engine was more valuable than the truck they
expected to receive.3 7
The supreme court's benefit-of-the-bargain approach in Fields stands in
sharp contrast to the out-of-pocket approach the court of appeals used in
Payne v. Holiday Towers, Inc.'"8 In Payne the court of appeals held that
the measure of damages resulting from deception in the sale of real estate
is "the difference between the purchase price of the property and its fair
market value."109 Thus, unlike a similarly situated purchaser of goods
under the supreme court's approach in Fields, a plaintiff who negotiates a
purchase of real estate for less than its represented value cannot capture the
incremental difference between the value as represented and the actual
purchase price. Payne limits the plaintiff's recovery to out-of-pocket losses
rather than expected benefit.
The Texas Supreme Court has ruled that damages under the Texas
equivalent of the UTPA may be measured by either the out-of-pocket or
benefit-of-the-bargain approach, whichever is greater."10 This method is
more consonant with the court of appeals's statement that the South Carolina
UTPA should be construed liberally."' Moreover, no logical reason exists
103. Id. at 209, 414 S.E.2d at 165.
104. Id. at 211, 414 S.E.2d at 166.
105. Id. (citing Baeza v. Robert E. Lee Chrysler, Plymouth, Dodge, Inc., 279 S.C.
468, 309 S.E.2d 763 (Ct. App. 1983)).
106. Id. (citing Baeza, 279 S.C. at 473, 309 S.E.2d at 766).
107. Id. at 211-12 414 S.E.2d at 166.
108. 283 S.C. 210, 321 S.E.2d 179 (Ct. App. 1984).
109. Id. at 216, 321 S.E.2d at 182 (citing Buzhardt v. Cromer, 272 S.C. 159, 249
S.E.2d 898 (1978)).
110. Leyendecker & Assocs. v. Wechter, 683 S.W.2d 369, 373 ('rex. 1984).
111. See Young v. Century Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 302 S.C. 320, 325, 396 S.E.2d
105, 108 (Ct. App. 1989) ("The UTPA should be given a liberal construction.") (citing
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for creating a more restrictive damages rule for deceptive sales of real estate
than for deceptive sales of goods.
B. Treble Damages and Willfulness
Section 39-5-140(a) provides for mandatory trebling of actual damages
when the court finds a willful violation of the UTPA. 112 Subsection (d)
provides that "a willful violation occurs when the party committing the
violation knew or should have known that his conduct was a violation of §
39-5-20. "113 Although the statute attempts to define "willful" conduct, the
language "should have known" suggests a negligence standard. Further-
more, the court of appeals opinion in State ex rel. Medlock v. Nest Egg
Society Today, Inc."4 apparently supports this interpretation.
In Nest Egg the attorney general brought an action against the defendant
under UTPA section 39-5-30"5 for operating a pyramid scheme." 6 The
lower court found that the defendant had willfully violated the Act.1 7 On
appeal the defendant contended that actual knowledge of a violation was
required before the court could find willfulness."' However, the court of
appeals disagreed: "The standard is not one of actual knowledge, but of
constructive knowledge. If, in the exercise of due diligence, a person of
ordinary prudence engaged in trade or commerce could have ascertained that
his conduct violates the Act, then such conduct is 'willful' within the
meaning of the statute."19 The court found Nest Egg's activities to be
willful because the company should have known that its activities violated
the UTPA. 120
Also, in Haley Nursery Co. v. Forrest"' the supreme court addressed
the issues of willfulness and treble damages under the Act. Haley, a
commercial nursery, breached an express warranty to Forrest, a peach
grower, by selling him mislabeled peach trees. After reviewing parts of the
trial testimony, the court found the violation not willful because Haley had
Paces Ferry Dodge, Inc. v. Thomas, 331 S.E.2d 4 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)).
112. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
113. Id. § 39-5-140(d).
114. 290 S.C. 124, 348 S.E.2d 381 (Ct. App. 1986).
115. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-30.
116. A pyramid scheme is "[a] device... in which a buyer of goods is promised a
payment for each additional buyer procured by him." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1237
(6th ed.).
117. Nest Egg, 290 S.C. at 126, 348 S.E.2d at 382.
118. See id. at 128, 348 S.E.2d at 383.
119. Id. at 128, 348 S.E.2d at 384.
120. Id. at 128-29, 348 S.E.2d at 384.
121. 298 S.C. 520, 381 S.E.2d 906 (1989).
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acted in accordance with common trade practices." Quoting the test from
Nest Egg, the supreme court upheld the trial court's denial of treble
damages." However, if South Carolina courts strictly apply the Nest Egg
reasonable person standard to section 39-5-140(d), treble damages would
seem to be warranted in all but the most innocent of UTPA violations.
Most states with multiple damage statutes attempt to limit the appli-
cation of these provisions. Some states require a showing of intent, bad
faith, reckless disregard for the truth, or the knowing nondisclosure of a fact
before punitive damages can be assessed.24 On the other hand, some
states condition multiple damages on the defendant's bad faith refusal to
settle a dispute rather than on the willfulness or recklessness of the
defendant's conduct."
C. Attorney's Fees
The UTPA provides an incentive for persons to bring suit under the Act
by requiring courts to award reasonable attorneys' fees and costs to
successful plaintiffs.' 26 When deciding the reasonableness of submitted
fees, courts consider factors such as the professional standing of the
plaintiff's attorney, the extent and type of legal services rendered, the
complexity of the case, and the results obtained for the plaintiff.27
Although the UTPAs of most states provide for attorney's fees in some
form, the statutes vary in their scope." For example, in Florida only
consumers can recover attorney's fees, but in North Carolina, attorney's
fees are awarded only if the defendant's conduct is willful and if the
defendant unjustifiably refuses to settle.
29
IV. TRENDS IN UTPA DEVELOPMENT
As South Carolina courts have developed UTPA doctrine, suits with
similar fact patterns have emerged. While certain categories of suits have
been very successful, others have been struck down repeatedly. Examination
of these patterns helps to assess the viability of bringing a UTPA action.
122. Id. at 525, 381 S.E.2d at 909.
123. Id.
124. See SHELDON, supra note 8, § 8.2.4.3.
125. Id. § 8.2.4.3.1-.2.
126. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
127.'Potomac Leasing Co. v. Bone, 294 S.C. 494, 499, 366 S.E.2d 26, 29 (Ct. App.
1988); Freeman v. A & M Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 293 S.C. 255, 265-66, 359 S.E.2d
532, 538 (Ct. App. 1987).
128. See generally SHELDON, supra note 8, § 8.6.
129. Id. § 8.6.2.1.
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A. Consumer Protection Actions
Consumer complaints, the most prolific of UTPA lawsuits, have been
brought to redress a variety of unfair and deceptive business practices.
Beginning with Barnes v. Jones Chevrolet Co. ," South Carolina appellate
courts have heard a series of consumer cases involving automobile
dealerships."' Barnes was a classic case of repair bill padding. The
plaintiff took his car to the dealership for repairs after the car was damaged
in an accident. The itemized repair bill the dealership submitted to the
plaintiff included over $900 in parts and labor that was never expended in
fixing the automobile. The plaintiff alleged fraud and deceit, breach of
contract, and violation of the UTPA. 3 2 The court held that padding auto
repair bills is an unfair trade practice and "affects the public interest because
of its potential for repetition.""'
Plaintiffs have also used the consumer protection component of the Act
to bring actions concerning the sale of real estate. In Payne v. Holiday
Towers, Inc.'34 a condominium developer allegedly made false representa-
tions and fraudulent concealments to prospective purchasers. The trial court
granted a default judgment to the plaintiffs on the issue of liability because
the vendor failed to file a timely answer. After a trial on the damages issues,
the court awarded the plaintiffs treble damages because it found the vendor's
violations of the Act were "willful and knowing."135 The court of appeals
affirmed. 1
36
Given the large number of consumer cases that have been brought
under the Act,'37 it seems likely that this area will continue to comprise
a large percentage of UTPA claims. With the relative ease of proving both
130. 292 S.C. 607, 358 S.E.2d 156 (Ct. App. 1987).
131. See, e.g., Ward v. Dick Dyer & Assocs., 304 S.C. 152, 403 S.E.2d 310 (1991);
Inman v. Ken Hyatt Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 294 S.C. 240, 363 S.E.2d 691 (1988);
Young v. Century Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 302 S.C. 320, 396 S.E.2d 105 (Ct. App.
1989); Dowd v. Imperial Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 298 S.C. 439, 381 S.E.2d 212 (Ct.
App. 1989).
132. Barnes, 292 S.C. at 609, 358 S.E.2d at 158.
133. Id. at 613, 358 S.E.2d at 159-60.
134. 283 S.C. 210, 321 S.E.2d 179 (Ct. App. 1984).
135. Id. at 213, 321 S.E.2d at 181.
136. Id.
137. For other examples of consumer protection cases, see State ex rel. McLeod v.
Brown, 278 S.C. 281, 294 S.E.2d 781 (1982) (deceptive sale of surge suppressors);
Potomac Leasing Co. v. Bone, 294 S.C. 494, 366 S.E.2d 26 (Ct. App. 1988) (deceptive
sale of steam cleaning machine); State ex rel. McLeod v. C & L Corp., 280 S.C. 519,
313 S.E.2d 334 (Ct. App. 1984) (deceptive sale of subdivision lots).
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deception138 and a public impact when consumers are involved, 39 the
UTPA should continue to provide an effective remedy for consumers.
B. Commercial Disputes
The public impact requirement 40 has repeatedly thwarted businesses
attempting to use the UTPA to solve contractual disputes with other
businesses."' An example of this limitation is found in Columbia East
Associates v. Bi-Lo, Inc.42 In Bi-Lo a grocery store chain entered into a
commercial lease agreement with the owners of a shopping center in
Columbia, South Carolina. The terms of the lease provided that Bi-Lo, the
lessee, could assign the lease or sublet the premises. After operating the
grocery store in the shopping center for over ten years, Bi-Lo relocated its
store. The shopping center corporation brought suit against Bi-Lo, alleging
breach of contract and violation of the UTPA.143
Although Bi-Lo continued to pay rent under the lease, the trial court
found that Bi-Lo had breached a good faith agreement of continuous
operation. However, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of Bi-Lo on
the UTPA claim.' The court of appeals affirmed both findings. On the
UTPA claim, the court held that the lease was a contract between private
parties that had no impact upon the public interest; thus, the breach of the
lease was not actionable under the Act.'4 5
Not every commercial dispute has been denied application of the UTPA
for lack of public impact. The key factor is the possibility of repetition. In
McTeer v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance'46 a United States district
court applying South Carolina law found that a breach of contract between
two commercial parties satisfied the public interest requirement." 7 The
defendant-creditors in McTeer agreed to waive a sixty-day notice require-
ment when the plaintiff sought to pay off its note early. Subsequently, the
138. See supra text accompanying notes 23-32.
139. See supra notes 42-60 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 42-60 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Florence Paper Co. v. Orphan, 298 S.C. 210, 379 S.E.2d 289 (1989);
LaMotte v. Punch Line, Inc., 296 S.C. 66, 370 S.E.2d 711 (1988); South Carolina Nat'l
Bank v. Silks, 295 S.C. 107, 367 S.E.2d 421 (Ct. App. 1988); Key Co. v. Fameco
Distribs., Inc., 292 S.C. 524, 357 S.E.2d 476 (Ct. App. 1987); Noack Enters., Inc. v.
Country Comer Interiors, Inc., 290 S.C. 475, 351 S.E.2d 347 (Ct. App. 1986).
142. 299 S.C. 515, 386 S.E.2d 259 (Ct. App. 1989).
143. Id. at 517-19, 386 S.E.2d at 260-61.
144. Id. at 519, 386 S.E.2d at 261.
145. Id. at 522, 386 S.E.2d at 263.
146. 712 F. Supp. 512 (D.S.C. 1989).
147. Id. at 516.
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plaintiff learned that it had been charged sixty days' interest despite the
waiver.148 From the defendants' answers to interrogatories it was clear that
"their challenged acts appear[ed] to be their practice in cases of loan
prepayment."1 49 The court concluded that the transaction was more than
just a contract breach because the defendants' actions had a potential for
repetition that could affect the public interest.1"°
In another commercial dispute case, Florence Paper Co. v. Or-
phan,15 1 the South Carolina Supreme Court noted that unfair methods of
competition could inherently affect the public interest. In Florence Paper
Co. the plaintiff corporation alleged that the defendant, a former employee
of the plaintiff, was using confidential information gained as an employee
to the plaintiff's detriment.' The plaintiff argued that unfair methods of
competition inherently affect the public interest. 53 The supreme court
stated: "While we do not reject this idea, we conclude that such an impact
could not be inherent in this situation where only two direct competitors are
involved. ""' The court's holding implies that the public impact require-
ment may be satisfied if unfair methods of competition affect an entire
industry or even several competitors within a given market.
Commercial plaintiffs seeking to resolve a business dispute by bringing
a UTPA claim against another commercial enterprise should recognize the
difficulty of proving public impact in some cases. As Florence Paper Co.
illustrates, however, commercial plaintiffs may be able to negotiate
successfully the UTPA's public impact requirement under appropriate
circumstances. To avoid dismissal of UTPA claims, plaintiffs must allege
and prove facts sufficient to show that a defendant's challenged acts have the
potential for repetition.
C. Dealer Termination Disputes
The alleged wrongful termination of a distributorship or franchise by
the parent organization is a specialized type of business dispute that merits
separate discussion. Such cases have been litigated under the UTPA
infrequently in South Carolina courts, but federal courts applying South
Carolina law have developed fairly consistent rules governing these disputes.
148. Id. at 514.
149. Id. at 516.
150. Id.
151. 298 S.C. 210, 379 S.E.2d 289 (1989).
152. See id. at 211-12, 379 S.E.2d at 290.
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In Glaesner v. Beck/Arnley Corp."55 the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a supplier's termination of a distributorship is wrongful
if "the supplier . . . acted maliciously and without reasonable business
justification.""5 6 The Glaesner court found no wrongful termination, and
hence denied recovery under the UTPA because the distributorship contract
provided that either party could terminate the arrangement at will and
because the defendant introduced sufficient evidence that it based the
termination on reasonable business justifications."5 7 The court also noted
that "[i]t is unclear whether wrongful termination alone will support a
[IUTPA claim" 15 8 and that "[o]rdinarily, violations of []UTPA are either
antitrust or consumer actions."159
As Glaesner indicates, wrongful distributorship termination suits are
difficult to bring successfully under the UTPA. In order to recover, the
plaintiff must show bad faith and a lack of business justification for the
termination. Since courts are not likely to second-guess such business
decisions," 6° UTPA actions based on wrongful termination are best
reserved for the more egregious of distributorship terminations.
In Chuck's Feed & Seed Co. v. Ralston Purina Co.,1 another
distributorship case, the plaintiff based its UTPA claim on vertical trade
restraint 62 as well as wrongful termination." The plaintiff-distributor
charged that the defendant-supplier terminated the parties' distributorship
agreement after the plaintiff began to carry a competitor's agricultural feed
products. After reviewing federal cases regarding vertical trade restraint, the
Chuck's court adopted the following test to determine whether a plaintiff
states a UTPA cause of action for this type of activity:
First, the court must determine the nature of the relevant market by
identifying the particular type of goods and the geographical area
involved. Second, the court must determine how much of that market
has been closed off to the products of competing manufacturers because
155. 790 F.2d 384 (4th Cir. 1986).
156. Id. at 389; accord Blanton Enters., Inc. v. Burger King Corp., 680 F. Supp. 753,
768 (D.S.C. 1988).
157. Glaesner, 790 F.2d at 389; see also Richland Wholesale Liquors v. Glenmore
Distilleries Co., 818 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that terms of contract and
business justification supported termination).
158. Glaesner, 790 F.2d at 390.
159. Id.
160. See Richland Wholesale Liquors, 818 F.2d at 317.
161. 810 F.2d 1289 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 827 (1987).
162. Vertical trade restraint exists when an agreement between a supplier and a
purchaser restricts the purchaser from dealing with third parties. Id. at 1294 n.2.
163. See id. at 1291-92.
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of exclusive dealing arrangements required by the defendant.... Third,
the court should consider any procompetitive effects of the exclusive
dealing arrangements that would justify their use.
164
Applying this test, the court concluded that the lower court should have
granted the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
because the plaintiff failed to offer evidence demonstrating that the defendant
used an exclusive dealing arrangement "to keep competing brands of feed
out of a substantial percentage of the feed dealerships in the area." 65
As in wrongful termination suits, substantial problems exist with
bringing a UTPA cause of action based on vertical trade restraint. To avoid
a directed verdict in these cases, a plaintiff must introduce evidence about
the particular market and geographical area affected by the exclusive dealing
arrangement and the extent to which the arrangement affects competition.
In addition, a plaintiff should produce evidence showing that the vertical
restraint arrangement provides no procompetitive benefits.
D. Antitrust Actions
Another major category of UTPA violations that has been litigated in
South Carolina concerns allegations of business monopolization. Bocook
Outdoor Media, Inc. v. Summey Outdoor Advertising, Inc.166 is the
seminal case in this area. Both parties in Bocook were in the business of
renting advertising space on billboards. Each company would lease a
billboard location from a landowner, erect a billboard, and then solicit
customers' advertisements. Bocook alleged that Summey tried to persuade
landowners to terminate their oral leases with Bocook and to enter into
leases with Summey instead. 67 Bocook also alleged that Summey entered
into a noncompetitive market division agreement with another outdoor
advertiser to try to monopolize the business to Bocook's detriment.
16
Summey counterclaimed that Bocook violated the UTPA by engaging in
similar activity. 1
69
The court of appeals affirmed the jury's award of $10,000 for Bocook
on the UTPA claim. The court held that the jury could have reasonably
concluded that Summey engaged in unfair competition by paying a bonus to
its employees for "each billboard face belonging to Bocook that was
164. Id. at 1295.
165. Id.
166. 294 S.C. 169, 363 S.E.2d 390 (Ct. App. 1987).
167. Id. at 172, 175-76, 363 S.E.2d at 391, 393-94.
168. Id. at 172, 179, 363 S.E.2d at 391, 395.
169. Id. at 172, 363 S.E.2d at 391-92.
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removed due to Summey obtaining the lease on the property from the
landlord""' and by obtaining a Bocook lease even though Summey could
not erect its own billboard due to regulations.171 The court also affirmed
the jury's verdict in favor of Summey on its UTPA counterclaim that
Bocook failed to remove its billboards from certain sites in a timely
manner. 
172
In Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Columbia Outdoor Advertising,
Inc. 73 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, construing the South Carolina
UTPA, addressed the public impact requirement in the context of an
antitrust action. In Omni the plaintiff billboard company alleged that the
defendant, a competitor, used its influence with local officials to persuade
the Columbia City Council to pass an ordinance that prohibited construction
of new billboards without the express consent of the Council. As a result of
the ordinance, the plaintiff was unable to compete with the established
defendant. 174 The court held that "a finding of conspiracy to restrain
competition is tantamount to a finding that the underlying conduct has 'an
impact upon the public interest.'"175 Consequently, the court of appeals
reversed the district court's entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict
for the defendant and reinstated the jury verdict for the plaintiff. 1
76
On further appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the court
of appeals, concluding that no conspiracy existed because governments and
parties who lawfully lobby them are exempt from the federal antitrust
laws. 1" This ruling effectively negated the court of appeals's holding that
a conspiracy to restrain competition automatically affects the public.
Nevertheless, the holding may still be applicable to purely private conspira-
cies not involving a governmental body.
Whether a party can use the UTPA as an antitrust remedy is unclear
because few such cases have been reported. As Bocook illustrates, though,
plaintiffs have been successful in using the Act in the context of antitrust
actions. Moreover, the possibility of bringing a claim under the UTPA for
170. Id. at 179, 363 S.E.2d at 395.
171. Id. at 179-80, 363 S.E.2d at 396.
172. Id. at 182, 363 S.E.2d at 397. Apparently neither party argued for dismissal of
the other's claim because public impact was lacking. The, opinion contains no discussion
of the public impact requirement.
173. 891 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1989), rev'd sub nom. City of Columbia v. Omni
Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1344 (1991).
174. Id. at 1130.
175. Id. at 1143.
176. Id.
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anticompetitive activities, rather than under federal antitrust statutes, should
appeal to South Carolina lawyers. The statute is much easier to work with
than the complex federal antitrust provisions, and, of course, state courts are
available to hear UTPA disputes.
V. UNDEVELOPED TERRITORY
South Carolina appellate courts have yet to address several areas of
potential UTPA application. One such area, price discrimination, has strong
antitrust overtones. In Jackson v. Atlantic Soft Drink Co.,178 the only
reported case in South Carolina to address this type of claim, the supreme
court reversed a demurrer and remanded the case on the familiar ground that
a question of first impression should not be decided on demurrer. 79 The
plaintiff-seller in Jackson alleged that the defendant-supplier was undercut-
ting the plaintiff's profits by supplying soft drinks to competitors at
substantially lower wholesale prices, which allowed the competitors to
charge lower retail prices than the plaintiff for the same products. 8 ' The
case was not appealed again; therefore, the issue of price discrimination as
the basis for a UTPA claim remains unresolved.
Other jurisdictions have addressed UTPA issues not yet explored in
South Carolina, including unreasonable failure to pay an insurance
claim,"' attorney misconduct,"8 and landlord-tenant disputes. 
8 3
178. 286 S.C. 577, 336 S.E.2d 13 (1985).
179. Id. at 579, 336 S.E.2d at 14.
180. Id. at 578, 336 S.E.2d at 14.
181. See, e.g., Carpentino v. Transport Ins. Co., 609 F. Supp. 556 (D. Conn. 1985)
(holding that employee could bring action under the Connecticut UTPA for damages
suffered when employer's workers' compensation insurer allegedly terminated insurance
benefits in bad faith); Levy v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 586 P.2d 845
(Wash. 1978) (en banc) (holding that plaintiffs complaint that insurance company
wrongfully refused to pay disability benefits stated a valid cause of action under the
Washington Consumer Protection Act).
182. See, e.g., Guenard v. Burke, 443 N.E.2d 892 (Mass. 1982) (holding that
attorney's contingent fee agreement in a divorce case violated Supreme Judicial Court
rules and constituted an unfair or deceptive act or practice under Massachusetts law).
183. See, e.g., McGrath v. Mishara, 434 N.E.2d 1215 (Mass. 1982) (holding that
landlord's improper deduction from tenant's security deposit was an unfair or deceptive
practice under Massachusetts UTPA); Love v. Pressley, 239 S.E.2d 574 (N.C. Ct. App.
1977) (finding that landlord's improper entry into plaintiff's residence and improper
conversion of plaintiff's property was an unfair or deceptive act or practice under North
Carolina UTPA), cert. denied, 241 S.E.2d 843 (N.C. 1978).
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VI. CONCLUSION
In his 1982 article Professor Day queried whether the South Carolina
Unfair Trade Practices Act was a "sleeping giant" or an "illusive pana-
cea." 184 To date the Act has been neither. Undoubtedly, it is an effective
tool to remedy unfair and deceptive trade practices. Courts have liberally
construed the Act, requiring only a capacity to deceive rather than proof of
common-law fraud. Courts have also extended the Act to hold principals
liable for the actions of their agents and to reach controlling persons of
corporations. In addition, the Act's liberal remedy provision allows recovery
of treble damages and attorneys fees in some instances.
However, the Act is also substantially limited. Although the South
Carolina Supreme Court recently adopted a less expansive approach to
statutorily exempt activities, the stringent public impact requirement
continues to defeat the majority of commercial claims brought under the
UTPA. Yet, the public impact requirement provides a necessary counter-
balance within the Act. Without this requirement, plaintiffs who were not
actually deceived could use the Act in an oppressive manner to resolve
purely private disputes. Also, the requirement ensures that a statement or
omission that did not actually deceive will not serve as the basis for a claim
unless the plaintiff can show at least a potential for wide-spread deceit.
As the UTPA has developed, it has begun to take its place among
traditional contract and fraud actions. The Act has not become all-consuming
in its breadth, nor should it. Courts have fashioned sensible rules governing
its application, particularly with the recent supreme court ruling that
narrows the previously overbroad exemption for regulated conduct.
Nevertheless, substantial issues remain undecided, and until they are
addressed, the full impact of the UTPA will remain unknown.
184. DAY, supra note 10.
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